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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
TURNER V. KIGHT: FILING PENDENT CLAIMS IN
FEDERAL COURT SUSPENDS THE STATE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS UNTIL THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE
PENDANT CLAIMS TERMINATE.

By: Michael Beste

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when state law claims
are filed in federal court based on supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant
to Section 1367 of Title 28 of the United States Code, the state statute
of limitations is suspended while the pendant claims are pending.
Turner v. Kight, 406 Md. 167, 957 A.2d 984 (2008). The court further
held that the suspension continues from the filing of the claim in
federal court until thirty days after the district court dismisses the
claim or, if appealed, the order dismissing the appeal or a mandate
affirming the district court's dismissal. !d. at 189, 957 A.2d at 996-97.
On May 15, 2001, Sherri Turner ("Turner") filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland ("District
Court") against Montgomery County Sheriff Raymond Kight and
other officials ("County Officials"), alleging twelve federal law
violations and seven Maryland state law violations. The allegations
arose from events that transpired in April 2000, concerning the
execution of a warrant for Turner's arrest and alleged mistreatment
while in the State's custody. On March 26, 2002, the District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the County Officials on ten
federal law counts, and dismissed two federal law counts.
Consequently, the District Court declined to assert jurisdiction over
the state law claims. On January 15, 2004, following denial of
Turner's second motion to reconsider, Turner filed a timely appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On January
7, 2005, the appellate court affirmed the District Court's decision. On
March 16, 2005, the appellate court issued an appellate mandate,
affirming the dismissal. On March 21, 2005, the mandate was
docketed, terminating the federal action.
On March 11, 2005, Turner filed the state law claims in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County. The circuit court granted the County
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Officials' motion to dismiss, holding that Section 1367(d) of Title 28
of the United States Code ("Section 1367(d)") required Turner to file a
complaint in state court within thirty days following the District
Court's dismissal because the three-year state statute of limitations ran
while the claims were pending in federal court. Turner appealed to the
Court of Special of Appeals of Maryland, which agreed with the
circuit court's rationale and affirmed the dismissal. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted Turner's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Section 1367(d) provides that the statute of limitations of pendent
claims in federal court "shall be tolled while the claim is pending and
for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed." Turner, 406 Md. at 175,
957 A.2d at 988 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1990)). The Court of
Appeals of Maryland found that the definitions of "tolling" and
"pending," as used in Section 1367(d), were ambiguous. Turner, 406
Md. at 176-79, 957 A.2d at 989-90. Accordingly, the court relied on
other jurisdictions and legislative history to determine Congress'
intent. /d. at 177-82, 957 A.2d at 989-93.
of the tolling
The court acknowledged three possible inteTP,retations
\
effect provided in Section 1367(d) which have been adopted in other
jurisdictions: the suspension approach, the extension approach, and the
substitution approach. /d. at 177, 957 A.2d at 989-90 (citing
Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 755 N.W.2d 354, 356-58 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008)). The court adopted the suspension approach, which provides
that state statutes of limitations are suspended while pendent claims
are pending in federal court. Turner, 406 Md. at 182, 957 A.2d at
992-93. The court explained that under this approach, when the
claims are dismissed from federal court, the statutory period resumes
for plaintiffs filing state law claims in state court, in addition to a thirty
day extension. /d. at 177-78, 957 A.2d at 990.
The court recognized that some jurisdictions rejected the
suspension approach because thirty days is ample time to file claims in
state court. /d. at 179, 957 A.2d at 991 (citing Kolani v. Gluska, 64
Cal. App. 4th 402, 410 (1998)). Nevertheless, the court found that, by
definition, a "tolling statute .. .interrupts the running of a statute of
limitations in certain situations." Turner, 406 Md. at 181, 957 A.2d at
992 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (8th ed. 2004)). The
court also found that this interpretation of "tolling" was adopted by the
United States Supreme Court. Turner, 406 Md. at 181, 957 A.2d at
992 (citing Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 652 (1983)). The court
concluded that Congress intended the suspension approach because it
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is most consistent with the common definition of "tolling." Turner,
406 Md. at 182, 957 A.2d at 992-93.
The court examined the extension approach, which provides that
plaintiffs have thirty days to file a complaint in state court following
termination of pendent claims in federal court, but only when the state
statute of limitations expires while the pendant claims are pending. !d.
at 177, 957 A.2d at 990. The court found that Congress did not intend
this approach because Section 1367(d) requires tolling in every claim
based on supplemental jurisdiction, not merely upon the condition that
the state statutory period expired. !d. at 179-80, 957 A.2d at 991
(citing Goodman, 755 N.W.2d at 357-58). Despite the court's
recognition that the extension approach avoids encroachment upon
state sovereignty, the court asserted that it must interpret Congress'
intent, not implant its concerns into the legislation. Turner, 406 Md. at
181-82, 957 A.2d at 992.
The court also analyzed the substitution approach, in which the
federal statute of limitations substitutes the state limitations period
when a party files pendent claims in federal court. !d. at 177, 957
A.2d at 990 (citing Goodman, 755 N.W.2d at 356-57). The court
found that Section 1367(d) provides that the statutory period is tolled,
not substituted, while the claims are pending. Turner, 406 Md. at 180,
957 A.2d at 991. The court explained that if Congress intended a
substitution approach, it would have specified the moment in which
the federal statute of limitations supersedes the state law. !d. (citing
Goodman, 755 N.W.2d at 357-58).
The court next considered the definition of "pending," as used in
Section 1367(d), and found that term ambiguous because it was
unclear whether a claim was pending during appeal. Turner, 406 Md.
at 182, 957 A.2d at 993. The court reasoned that if claims were not
"pending" during appeal, plaintiffs would be forced to file protective
claims in state court while pursuing an appeal in federal court. Id. at
186, 957 A.2d at 995. The court anticipated that because state courts
.may be disinclined to permit inactive cases on the docket, litigation
may ensue in both systems, leading to potential inconsistent results.
!d.
Relying on legislative history, the court noted that language, which
suggested that a claim is pending only while in the district court, was
omitted from a proposal for Section 1367(d). !d. at 188-89, 957 A.2d
at 996 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 11 (1990)). The court found
that this omission suggested that Congress intended claims to be
pending while on appeal. Turner, 406 Md. at 189, 957 A.2d at 996.
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Although the court found that claims are pending through an appeal of
right, the court noted that claims may not be pending when petitioning
for certiorari because appeals to courts of last resort are discretionary.
Id. at 183, 957 A.2d at 993 (citing Kendrick v. City of Eureka, 82 Cal.
App. 4th 364, 370 (2000)). The court declined to decide this issue,
however, because it was not presented by the parties on appeal.
Turner, 406 Md. at 189, 957 A.2d at 997. The court held that Turner
properly filed a complaint in state court before the statute of
limitations ran. Id. at 189, 957 A.2d at 997.
The court's holding in Turner provides plaintiffs with ample time to
file state law claims in state courts following dismissal of pendent
claims in federal courts. However, practitioners should be mindful
that the court reserved the issue of whether a claim is pending while
petitioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. Therefore,
attorneys should file protective actions in state court to prevent the
statute of limitations from expiring while petitioning for a writ of
certiorari. Furthermore, attorneys should meticulously count the days
to determine the new statute of limitations for state law claims, rather
than simply estimating or counting a certain number of years into the
future. Despite modern electronic scheduling capabilities, such a
calendaring process is ripe for confusion and mistakes.

